Fake QR codes on parking meters in Switzerland have been reported in at least three places since mid-October 2026: Lucerne and Emmen, the Bern area including Thun, and most recently Sarnen in the canton of Obwalden. Local police and councils say the stickers are placed over the real payment codes and send people to look-alike payment pages that try to collect card details. It is a familiar scam, but the Swiss reports add a useful detail for anyone who runs payment codes: police keep telling drivers to scan inside their payment or parking app, not with the phone camera. This article covers what was reported, why that advice works, and what a dynamic QR platform can and cannot do about it.

Disclosure: we make D-QR, a dynamic QR code platform, so we have an interest in this topic. A sticker on someone else's meter is outside any software's reach, ours included. We say where our product helps and where it does not.

Fake QR codes on parking meters in Switzerland: what was reported

Three separate announcements came within about three weeks of each other. None of the reports we read gives a total number of stickers or victims, so we do not offer one. The table summarises who said what, and the sections below add detail.

PlaceReportedSource of the warningWhat was said
Lucerne and Emmen28 October 2026Lucerne police, via a regional newspaperFake codes found on several meters since 12 October
Bern area and Thun20 to 23 October 2026City of Thun, then Bern cantonal policeMore fake codes on meters across the canton in recent days
Sarnen, Obwalden5 November 2026Obwalden police and the municipalityFake codes found on several meters

Lucerne and Emmen: since 12 October

The regional paper Bote der Urschweiz reported on 28 October 2026 that, according to a police notice, several fake QR codes had been found on parking meters in the city of Lucerne and in Emmen since 12 October. The affected meters were on Vonmattstrasse, Dufourstrasse, Bruchstrasse, Säälistrasse, Pilatusstrasse, Kasimir-Pfyffer-Strasse and Alpenquai, plus the meters at the Mooshüsli lido in Emmen.

The police say the fakes are stuck over the codes already on the meters. Anyone who scans one is taken to a payment page where the fraudsters try to capture payment details. The police expect more fake codes to appear. The newspaper adds that fake codes had already shown up on public meters across Switzerland at the end of 2024, so this is a return, not a first.

Bern and Thun: 20 to 23 October

According to Plattform J, a Bernese news site, the city of Thun warned on Tuesday 20 October that fake QR code stickers had been found on several of its parking columns, and said it was checking all its car parks. On Friday 23 October, Bern cantonal police said fake codes had been appearing more often on meters in recent days, in and around Bern and in the Bernese Oberland, and that they could not rule out other parts of the canton.

The police described how to recognise them. A fake is a separate sticker added on top of the existing payment information or the meter's own code, and it can be hard to notice without a close look. In the fake Twint codes found so far, the Twint logo is sometimes missing. The fake stickers also ask people to scan with the phone camera, which is not how people normally pay at these meters.

Sarnen: 5 November

On 5 November 2026, the Obwaldner Zeitung reported that fake QR codes had turned up on several meters in the municipality of Sarnen, and that police were warning about the scam, which it calls quishing. Fraudsters stick fake codes over the official ones and send users to fraudulent payment pages to collect payment data. Mimikama's write-up says the stickers found were removed. The paper notes that Lucerne police had reported tampering with meters in October.

What Swiss police tell drivers to do

The advice is consistent across the three announcements, and it is more specific than the usual "be careful".

Why "scan in the app" is better than "inspect the sticker"

Visual inspection is a weak defence. A good fake looks like the real thing, and a driver in a hurry does not feel for a raised edge. The Swiss advice moves the check to a place where it cannot be faked by a sticker: the in-app scanner. A payment app's scanner reads payment codes from that service. A fake that points to a web page, rather than a genuine payment code, does not work there, which is why police say the app shows an error.

A phone camera is different. It will open whatever address a code contains. That is the whole attack: the fraudster wants the camera, because the camera does not know which codes are genuine. Our guide to whether QR codes are safe explains why a scan only reads text and why the damage happens on the page that opens.

The limit is that this only protects people who follow it. A driver who points a camera at the sticker is still exposed, and no operator can force the habit. What operators can do is design the genuine flow so that the right behaviour is obvious: print "open the app, choose your zone" on the meter itself, and say in words that the meter is not paid by scanning with the camera.

What software cannot fix

It is worth being direct about the limits. Many of the codes involved here are payment codes tied to Twint or a parking app. They are not created in a QR code platform account, so a platform neither sees nor controls them. The stickers are printed by someone else and stuck on a meter that is not theirs, and no dashboard can remove them.

Be sceptical of anything marketed as a tamper-proof printed code. In public, the first line of defence is people walking the site.

If you run QR codes, what a dynamic code can add

If you operate a car park, venue or any site where people legitimately scan a code, a dynamic QR code generator gives you tools to notice trouble sooner and respond without reprinting. These are things the product does today.

None of this reveals a scammer's sticker. It shows what your own codes are doing, which is often enough to prompt a site visit. Our pillar guide, What Is a Dynamic QR Code?, explains why a redirect you control is easier to manage than a code with the address baked in.

A checklist for operators after a nearby incident

  1. Walk every site. Thun's response of checking all its car parks is the right first step. Photograph each genuine code in place so an overlay is obvious next time.
  2. Assume it returns. The Bote report notes the same trick appeared across Switzerland in 2024. Build inspection into the routine.
  3. Say it on the meter. State plainly how payment works and that the camera is not the way to pay.
  4. Print the real address. A short web address in plain text next to a code lets people compare it with what their phone previews.
  5. Give one way to report. A single phone number or form gets sticker sightings to you quickly.
  6. Keep a record per location. Note where and when stickers were found so a pattern shows up.

What drivers should do

Open your payment or parking app and pay from there. If a sticker tells you to scan with the camera, treat that as a warning in itself. Check the address if a page does open, and never enter card details on a page you reached from an unfamiliar code. If you already did, contact your bank and report it to the police.

The takeaway

The Swiss reports show a pattern more than a single event: one wave in Lucerne from 12 October, another in Bern and Thun a week later, and a third in Sarnen on 5 November, none with published victim counts. The most practical lesson is the police advice to pay inside the app, because it removes the sticker from the decision. If you run codes of your own, make genuine ones boringly predictable and watch what they do. To see how scan logs and pause controls work before deciding what you need, you can make a QR code for free. For a comparable case, read our piece on Mississauga's second wave of stickers or our wider article on fake QR code stickers on parking meters.

Sources

Incident details come from Bote der Urschweiz (28 October 2026), Plattform J (24 October 2026), the Obwaldner Zeitung (5 November 2026) and Mimikama. We read the German-language reports and paraphrase them; we have not independently verified the police statements. Product statements reflect our own plan documentation at the time of writing.